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Making the Obvious Choice Malpractice:
LLPs and the Lawyer Liability Time Bomb
in Kentucky's 2005 Tax Modernization
Thomas E. Rutledge' &Allan W VestaP
I. INTRODUCTION
T he treatment of limited liability partnerships (LLPs) under Ken-
tucky's tax modernization of 20053 is interesting in several respects.
First, by subjecting LLPs, limited liability companies (LLCs), and many
other structures traditionally taxed on a flow-through basis to an entity-
level tax as if they were corporations, 4 Kentucky moved to block a "loop-
hole" 5 and recapture revenues "lost" since the creation of the new entities
in 1994.' In altering the tax treatment of these forms, Kentucky has gone
against the national trend.7 Indeed, at the same time as the Kentucky legis-
I Member, Stoll Keenon Ogden PLLC, and Adjunct Professor of Law, University of
Kentucky College of Law.
2 Dean and Professor of Law, University of Kentucky College of Law.
3 See H.B. 272, 2005 Gen. Assem., Reg. Sess. (Ky. 2005).
4 The expanded definition of a "corporation," Ky. REV. STAT. ANN. § 141.010(24) (West
2005) (appearing at H.B. 272 § 3(24), 2005 Gen. Assem., Reg. Sess. (Ky. 2005)). See infra note
17 and accompanying text.
5 See, e.g., Jim Jordan, Limited Liability's Unlimited Appeal; Officials Think Law Has Cut Into
Tax Revenues, LEXINGTON HERALD-LEADER, Feb. 5, 2003, at AI ("State officials don't know how
much business-tax revenue they have lost since the Kentucky Limited Liability Companies
Act was passed in 1994. They think it's a lot."); Anonymous, Multiple Taxes: Governor Outlines
Tax Modernization Plan, 66 STATE TAX REV. 5 (Feb. 15, zoo5) ("With respect to corporate taxes,
the Governor said that 'loopholes' allowing large out-of-state companies to use the limited
liability company (LLC) structure to avoid paying tax were neither fair nor responsible.");
ADMIN. OF GOVERNOR PAUL E. PATTON, SECURING KENTUCKY'S FUTURE (20o3) (on file with the
Kentucky Law Journal) ("In 1994 the legislature authorized the LLC form of business organiza-
tion in Kentucky and created the largest loophole in the history of our tax code."). It should be
noted, however, that "[A tax loophole is] something that benefits the other guy. If it benefits
you it is tax reform." Russell B. Long, Thinkexist.com, http://en.thinkexist.com/quotation/
a-taxjloophole is-something that benefits-the/223o98.html (last visited Oct. 22, 2005).
6 Kentucky has had LLCs and LLPs since July 15, 1994. See Ky. REV. STAT. ANN.
§§ 362.555-362.595, 362.220(2) West 2005). The history of LLCs is generally reviewed in
the first two sections of an article Rutledge and Lady Booth wrote in 1994. See Thomas E.
Rutledge & Lady E. Booth, The Limited Liability Company Act: Understanding Kentucky's New
Organizational Option, 83 Ky. L.J. 1, 97-98 (1994-95) (briefly reviewing the LLP).
7 See generally Bruce P. Ely, State Taxation ofSubchapterS andSubchapter K Entities and Their
Owners-An Overview, in CHOICE OF ErrITY-2005 (ALI-ABA, Feb. 10, 2005) [hereinafter Ely
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lature was imposing corporate income taxes on LLPs, in effect imposing an
entity-level tax as rent for limited liability, the legislature of North Carolina
had before it a bill to extend limited liability to all partnerships without im-
posing entity-level taxation.' We live in interesting times. This article will
cover the shift in tax treatment in Part 2.
Second, by varying the tax treatment of general partnerships (GPs) and
LLPs, Kentucky created a required point of analysis for lawyers forming a
partnership entity where none previously existed. This, in turn, created a
legal malpractice trap where none previously existed. This prospective trap
will be discussed in Part 3.
Third, by making the tax treatment of LLPs retroactive to pre-exist-
ing LLPs, Kentucky turned the malpractice trap into a time bomb, po-
tentially extending lawyer liability to entity-selection advice given prior
to 2005 when there was but one correct decision. This time bomb may
require Kentucky lawyers to revisit partnership form selection determina-
tions made by clients based on advice given between the 1994 creation of
the LLP form and the 2005 passage of tax modernization. This we discuss
in Part 4.
Necessarily, some rather complicated tax provisions are simplified in
the initial discussion. The tax modernization treatment of LLPs is more
complicated than we discuss initially, and in Part 5 we develop a more com-
prehensive treatment of the tax analysis. To telegraph our conclusion: be-
cause partners in LLPs can obtain tax benefits at the individual level for
taxes paid at the entity level, it is true that the choice between the LLP
form and the GP form may be nearly netted out in some LLPs. But such
equipoise is not always the case, and thus the need for the choice of form
analysis-and the attendant malpractice trap-remains.
Having in Part 6 raised a range of legal malpractice exposures incident
to an attorney's response to the tax modernization statute as it applies to
LLPs, we close and offer our larger conclusions in Part 7.
Overview] ("In most states, the decision to conform to the Check-the-Box regulations for in-
come tax purposes was not controversial. Almost all states that impose a corporate income tax,
or its equivalent, have enacted legislation or announced in formal or informal guidance that
they will classify an LLC in the same manner as it is classified for federal tax purposes.");
Michael W. McLoughlin & Walter Hellerstein, State Tax Treatment of Foreign Corporate Partners
andLLCMembers After Check-the-Box, in 8 THE STATE AND LOCAL TAX LAWYER 1, 3 (2003) ("For
the most part, states follow the federal tax treatment of partnerships and treat them as pass-
through entities."); see also infra note 36.
8 H.B. 258, 2oo5 Gen. Assem., Reg. Sess. (N.C. zoo5). The North Carolina bill was not
enacted. Other efforts to extend limited liability without entity level taxation are being made
throughout the country. In 2005, the Uniform Limited Partnership Act (ULPA) (zool) was
submitted to a total of seven state legislatures. ULPA (zoo) alters traditional limited partner-
ship law by making the limited partner's limited liability more certain and by providing for an
elective limited liability limited partnership (LLLP) status under which the general partners
enjoy limited liability See UNI. LTD. P'sHiP AcT §§ zoi(a)(4), 303,404(c) (zoo).
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II. THE FIRST ORDER ANALYSIS: THE TAX MODERNIZATION
SHIFT IN LLP ANALYSIS
From the creation of the LLP form in Kentucky in 1994 until the effec-
tive date of the tax modernization legislation, a practitioner representing
a client forming a Kentucky partnership 9 had, for most purposes, two op-
tions but really only one choice. The first option was to form a general
partnership under Kentucky's enactment of the Uniform Partnership Act.'0
Partners in such a firm would have the benefit of flow-through taxation, as
the firm was not taxed at the entity level,"but would not have the benefit
of limited liability.'2
The second option was to form a general partnership that then elect-
ed to be an LLP under Kentucky's add-on Limited Liability Partnership
9 We assume for the purposes of this analysis an informed decision to form a partner-
ship, not an LLC or corporation. See generally J. WILLIAM CALLISON & MAUREEN A. SULLIVAN,
PARTNERSHIP LAW AND PRACTICE: GENERAL AND LIMITED PARTNERSHIPS ch. 2 (2oo4), and an
informed decision to form that partnership in Kentucky and not in another jurisdiction. But
see infra note i9. It should be recognized, however, that the discussion, which is presented in
terms of the LLP, is equally applicable to the LLC, and there likely will be situations in which
an LLC, for similar tax-driven reasons, will want to convert to a general partnership. In fact,
each year there are many more LLCs founded in Kentucky (14,839 organizations in 2oo4, the
last year for which figures are available) than there are LLPs (68 registrations in 2oo4); thus, it
will be in the LLC that the need for analysis is at least quantitatively greatest. See Kentucky
Secretary of State, Annual Business Filings Statistics (Sept. 7, 2005), http://sos.ky.gov/busi-
ness/filings/statschart.htm. We assume, however, that the LLC has been typically used where
statutory limited liability is more critical, and the conversion to a general partnership will be
therefore less acceptable.
io See Ky. REV. STAT. ANN. §§ 362.150-362.360 (West 2005). Kentucky has not yet joined
the thirty-six other states and jurisdictions that have adopted the Revised Uniform Partnership
Act (1997) (RUPA). THE NATIONAL CONFERENCE OF COMMISSIONERS ON UNIFORM STATE LAWS,
A FEW FACTS ABOUT THE... UNIFORM PARTNERSHIP ACT (1994)(I997), http://www.nccusl.org/
update/uniformact_factsheets/uniformacts-fs-upa9497.asp (last visited Oct. 25, 2005). RUPA
has been introduced in the Kentucky legislature and is the subject-together with the revi-
sion of Kentucky's LLC and general corporate statutes---of an ongoing study mandated by
the legislature. See H.C.R. 113, 2005 Gen. Assem., Reg. Sess. (Ky. 2005).
I I See Ky. REV. STAT. ANN. § 14 1.040 (West 2005). We acknowledge that as a theoretical
matter there is no "entity" under the UPA, which adopted an "aggregate-based" approach
to the partnership relationship. William Draper Lewis, The Uniform Partnership Act, 24 YALE
L.J. 617, 640 (1915); see also Gary S. Rosin, The Entity-Aggregate Dispute: Conceptualism and
Functionalism in Partnership Law, 42 ARK. L. REV. 395 (1989). This, of course, follows through
to the Kentucky LLP, which is simply a subform of the GP. See infra note 28. This is in contrast
to RUPA, which adopts an entity-based, and not an aggregate-based, theory of the partnership
relationship. See RUPA § 201(l) (1997); ROBERT W. HILLMAN, ALLAN W. VESTAL & DONALD J.
WEIDNER, THE REVISED UNIFORM PARTNERSHIP ACT 67 (2004). While this presents an interest-
ing theoretical impediment to the imposition of an entity-level tax, this conceptual impedi-
ment was easily overcome by the drafters of the tax modernization legislation: they simply
ignored it.
12 See Ky. REV. STAT. ANN. § 362.220(1) (West zoos).
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Act.' 3 Partners in such a firm would have the benefit of flow-through taxa-
tion and would enjoy the benefit of a partial limited liability shield.I4 There
being no significant marginal costs to forming as an LLP and not a GP,1s
the choice was clear: maintain flow-through taxation and gain a shield on
personal liability by forming as an LLP, not a GP. Indeed, it has been sug-
gested that, given this set of options, it might be malpractice to not form as
an LLP.
6
III. THE PROSPECTIVE MALPRACTICE TR"
The pre-tax modernization choice set forth in Part 2 is simple. Given the
options of the GP (flow-through taxation but personal liability) and the
LLP (flow-through taxation and a shield on personal liability), no rational
actor would choose the GP form. The choice following tax modernization is
sometimes much more complicated. That is because tax modernization, in
effect, sets up a potential trade-off between flow-through taxation and lim-
ited liability. After tax modernization, the issues of the GP choice remain
the same: partners enjoy flow-through taxation and they continue to bear
the burden of personal liability for firm liabilities.
Under tax modernization, it is the impact of the LLP choice that
changes. The modernization expands the definition of what is, for tax pur-
poses, a "corporation" subject to the "corporate" income tax, an expansion
that encompasses the LLP.' 7 Partners in a LLP lose flow-through taxation
13 Ky. REV. STAT. ANN. § 362-555-362.595, 362.220(2).
14 Ky. REV. STAT. ANN. § 362.220(2). As shorthand, we refer to the LLP "shield on personal
liability" in unqualified terms. We note here, but do not discuss in the broader treatment, the
exceptions to the liability shield. It needs to be recognized that Kentucky LLPs are partial-
and not full-shield LLPs. See generally Thomas E. Rutledge & Elizabeth G. Hester, Practical
Guide to Limited Liability Partnerships, in 5 STATE LIMITED LIABILITY COMPANY & PARTNERSHIP
LAWS § 2.1 (Supp. 4 (2004)). Regardless, the exceptions to the liability shield do not change
with tax modernization and are a constant in the option sets we describe.
15 We assume for the purposes of this discussion that the burdens of preparing the
initial filing, subsequent annual filings, and the $2oo annual filing fee would only outweigh
the benefits of the liability shield in the type of extraordinarily rare and grotesque firms one
would find only on law-school examinations. See Ky. REV. STAT. ANN. §9 362-555(1), 362.555(5),
362.555(3) (West 2005). Thus we ignore the possibility here, without prejudice to their use in
other settings on other days.
16 See Allan W. Vestal, "Assume a Rather Large Boat... ": The Mess We Have Made of
Partnership Law, 54 WASH. & LEE L. REV. 487, 513-17 (1997)
17 Under Ky. REV. STAT. ANN. § 141.010(24) (West 2005) (as amended by H.B. 272 § 3,
2oo5 Gen. Assem., Reg. Sess. (Ky. zoo5)) the definition of a corporation now provides:
"Corporations" means:
(a) "Corporations" as defined in Section 770 I (a)(3) of the Internal Revenue
Code;
(b) S corporations as defined in Section 1361(a) of the Internal Revenue
[Vol. 94
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through the imposition of entity-level income taxes on the firm.' Still, they
retain their shield on personal liability. Thus, under tax modernization, it
becomes a theoretical possibility that a rational actor might choose to form
as a GP and forego the benefits of LLP status. Consider two partnerships:
Acme and Excelsior.
Acme is in a line of business with operations that are, absent catastroph-
ic loss, neither economically stable nor predictable. Imagine a roadside bar
and fireworks factory outlet. Acme has a constantly shifting unskilled work-
force made up primarily of recently paroled drug dealers and arsonists, a
number of whom are also now-disbarred attorneys. It has an enthusiastic
clientele which could charitably be described as unstable, not prosperous,
and litigious. As an LLP, Acme will pay $250,000 per annum in entity-level
income taxes. Beyond the obvious risks of dram shop, explosion, and em-
ployee misconduct, Acme has an unpredictable set of liability risks. The
company is constantly branching out into new, untried operations and has a
constantly changing and growing set of employees. The constantly shifting
galaxy of realistic sources of tort or contract liability for Acme is unknow-
able, much less insurable. The participants have no confidence that they
can replicate the liability shield that would be available under the LLP
form. The cost of the insurance that would be available to Acme as a GP to
cover even some of the risk would be $300,000 per annum. Acme cannot
replicate the benefits of the LLP form by paying less than the $250,000 the
LLP form will cost in taxes. Clearly, it should adopt the LLP form.
Excelsior, by contrast, is in a line of business with operations that are
economically stable and predictable. Imagine a real-estate partnership with
Code;
(c) A foreign limited liability company as defined in KRS 275.015(6);
(d) A limited liability company as defined in KRS 275.015(8);
(e) A professional limited liability company as defined in KRS 275.015(19);
(f) A foreign limited partnership as defined in KRS 362.401(4);
(g) A limited partnership as defined in KRS 362.401(7);
(h) A registered limited liability partnership as defined in KRS 362.155(7);
(i) A real estate investment trust as defined in Section 856 of the Internal
Revenue Code;
(j) A regulated investment company as defined in Section 851 of the
Internal Revenue Code;
(k) A real estate mortgage investment conduit as defined in Section 86oD of
the Internal Revenue Code;
(1) A financial asset securitization investment trust as defined in Section
86oL of the Internal Revenue Code; and
(m) Other similar entities created with limited liability for their partners,
members, or shareholders.
18 Here we refer to Kentucky income taxation only. A LLP's tax classification for purpos-
es of federal income taxation is not altered by Kentucky's tax modernization; while taxed at
the entity-level for Kentucky purposes, barring a contrary election, the LLP is a flow-through
for federal purposes.
22 KENTUCKY LAW JOURNAL [Vol. 94
a developed property on a long-term, favorable, triple-net lease with a sta-
ble, prosperous tenant. As an LLP, Excelsior will pay $250,000 per annum
in entity-level income taxes. Assume further that Excelsior has a well-de-
fined and predictable set of liability risks. It is the lessor under a triple-net
lease with a reliable lessee that is required to maintain sufficient insur-
ance. Excelsior has no other operations and has no employees. All realistic
sources of tort or contract liability for Excelsior are insurable such that with
a very high degree of confidence the participants believe that they can rep-
licate the liability shield available under the LLP form. The cost of such
insurance will be $200,000 per annum.' 9 As a GP, Excelsior can replicate
the benefits of the LLP form by paying $200,000 in insurance premiums
and avoid $250,000 in taxes, a net savings of $50,000. Clearly, it should not
adopt the LLP form.
If one accepts that there will be real-world partnerships that will fall
toward the Excelsior end of the spectrum, then it becomes incumbent on
each attorney organizing a partnership to make the analysis of whether the
firm should or should not make the election to be an LLP.O Thus, by differ-
entiating the tax treatment of GPs and LLPs, Kentucky has created, where
none previously existed, a required point of analysis for lawyers forming
19 Of course, in the real world, it isn't an all-or-nothing calculus. Firms with the LLP li-
ability shield maintain insurance to protect firm assets from judgment creditors. At issue here
though is the excess insurance which could be obtained to protect the personal assets of firm
participants in the absence of the LLP liability shield. Law firms with Kentucky-licensed at-
torneys organized as LLPs (as well as LLCs or PSCs) are obligated to maintain malpractice
insurance or other means of satisfying client claims. Ky. Sup. CT. R. 3.024. For these firms,
the question is whether the cost of the marginal tax liability incurred by remaining an LLP
is offset by protection from liabilities exceeding the insurance purchased (often in amounts
exceeding the legal minimums) or retained in the form of retentions / deductibles. See infra
text accompanying notes 34-36.
20 We put to the side, as beyond the scope of this discussion, the professional responsibil-
ity questions of whether a single attorney can purport to represent all the participants (or "the
firm") in such a transaction. See generally Ky. Sup. CT. R. 3.130(0.13) (organization as client); Ky.
Sup. CT. R. 3.130(I.7) (loyalty to client); Manion v. Nagin, No. 00-238 ADM-RLE, 2004 U.S.
Dist. LEXIS 1776 (D. Minn. Feb. 4, 2004), aff'd, 394 F3d io6z (8th Cir. 2005) (explaining that
while the organization of a corporation would not normally create attorney-client relationship
with the corporation's constituents, an attorney-client relationship had arisen out of personal
legal advice rendered to a constituent); Dean R. Dietrich, Representing a Partnership or Limited
Liability Company, 72 Wis. LAW. 37 (Nov. 1999) (noting the difficulty in determining whether
representation is of partnership/LLC or of the partners/members and the obligation of the
attorney to clarify the situation in an engagement letter); RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF THE LAW
GOVERNING LAWYERS § 51 (2000) (discussing a lawyer's duty of care to certain nonclients); see
also infra note 43. We suggest that the single attorney seeking to represent all of the constitu-
ents does so at great peril to her ability to satisfy her obligations of loyalty. See generally Robert
R. Keatinge, Professional Responsibility and Liability in the Selection and Organization of Business
Entities (ALI-ABA, March 25, 1999). We would note, however, that even if we are wrong and
a single attorney may comfortably perform such a function, such a finding would only inten-
sify, not change or ameliorate, the malpractice considerations in the post-tax-modernization
world.
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a partnership entity. This, in turn, creates a legal malpractice trap where
none previously existed.
Some practitioners may be tempted to simply form the partnership in
another jurisdiction to avoid the Kentucky statute-based problem. 21 Al-
though legislative debates and popular press reports frequently miss the
point,2" as lawyers we all recognize that firms organized in other states are
free to conduct business within the Commonwealth.3 The tax moderniza-
tion statute frustrates this avoidance mechanism by taxing the Kentucky
21 Whether any LLPs should have been formed in Kentucky is open to dispute. One of
the authors believes it to border on, if not be, malpractice per se for an attorney to form an
LLP in Kentucky, a partial-shield jurisdiction, when the LLP could be formed in a full-shield
jurisdiction, qualified to transact business in Kentucky, and takes the position that the full li-
ability shield afforded by that foreign jurisdiction must be respected in Kentucky. See Ky. REV.
STAT. ANN. §§ 362.575(5), 362.585 (West 2005).
22 We are reminded of the 2002 debate over the proposed Constitutional amendments
which consistently and without any basis in fact equated business formations under Kentucky
law with business activity in the Commonwealth. See, e.g., Ken Berzof, Business Amendment
Goes to Voters, COURIER-JOURNAL (Louisville), Nov. 5, 2002, at IF ("Economic-development
officials say the changes are long overdue and vital to the state's future. Two-thirds of the
states have taken similar steps, and supporters contend that if Kentucky holds on to its old
constitutional provisions, companies would think twice about locating in the state."); Al Cross,
Constitutional Amendments; Measures on Corporations, Family-Law Courts Pass Easily, COURIER-
JOURNAL (Louisville), Nov. 6, 2002, at 5X ("Supporters of the amendment, such as Associated
Industries of Kentucky and the state Chamber of Commerce, said it would make Kentucky
more attractive to new businesses by making it more favorable for them to incorporate in the
state."). This is not to say, however, that the 2002 amendments were without economic merit.
See Thomas E. Rutledge, Amendment No. 2 Will Modernize Business Law, LEXINGTON HERALD-
LEADER, Oct. 21, 2002, at A8 ("Kentucky is one of only a handful of states that still retain
archaic constitutional provisions governing corporations. The provisions drive Kentucky busi-
nesses to organize outside of our state, and to pay substantial fees to other state treasuries for
that privilege, without providing any added protection to Kentucky citizens. Having these
provisions is not worth the economic price we pay to keep them.").
23 See Paul v. Virginia, 75 U.S. (8 Wall.) 168 (1869); Henry N. Butler, Nineteenth-Century
Jurisdictional Competition in the Granting of Corporate Privileges, 14 J. LEGAL STUD. 129, 155-56
(1985); Ky. REV. STAT. ANN. §§ 362.575(4), 362.585(1) (West 2005) (foreign LLP transacting
business in Kentucky); Ky. REV. STAT. ANN. §§ 275.380, 275.385 (West 2005) (foreign LLC
transacting business in Kentucky); § 271B.i5-oio (foreign corporation transacting business in
Kentucky). The choice of law considerations with respect to GPs, under both the UPA and
RUPA, complicate matters by looking to the formation and operations of the firm, and not a
formal filing, to determine the applicable law. See REVISED UNIF. P'SHIP ACT § io6 cmt. (0997);
see also ROBERT W. HILLMAN, ALLAN W. VESTAL & DONALD J WEIDNER, THE REVISED UNIFORM
PARTNERSHIP ACT 67 (2004). Choice of law for an LLP, on the other hand, turns on the juris-
diction in which the LLP filing is made. See Ky. REV. STAT. ANN. § 362.575(2), (3) (West 2005);
REVISED UNIF. P'sHip ACT §§ Io6(b), I ioi(a) (1997).
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operations of foreign LLPs.24 This actually makes the analytic burden for
the lawyer even more complicated.2"
If avoidance will not work, doing the extra work will. Lawyers involved
in the organization of partnerships are simply going to have to lead their
clients through the analysis required to determine if the firm at issue is
one of those in which it makes economic sense to abandon the personal
liability shield. The characteristics of the firms in which it might now make
sense to organize as GPs are clear: predictable and fully insurable potential
liabilities; predictable insurance costs; and predictable Kentucky income-
tax liability. Even where the insurance cost turns out to be less than the
additional income tax liability, participants may still elect to give up the
savings and assume the cost of the LLP formation if they are unusually risk
averse (which, as one might imagine, would not be unusual in people who
form firms that have such predictable liabilities and costs).
IV. TURNING THE TRAP INTO A TIME BOMB: IT'S RETROACTIVE
So, as it turns out, our parents were right. The way to avoid liability is to do
the required work. Good enough. The problem is that the legal malpractice
trap in the tax modernization treatment of LLPs is not just a trap. It is a
time bomb because it implicates decisions lawyers made on firm-entity
selection for the past eleven years and may require that lawyers go back
and test-and possibly change-determinations that were beyond ques-
tion when made.2
6
Take our Excelsior partnership as an example. Post tax-modernization,
because the cost of insuring against Excelsior's potential participant liabili-
ties as a GP is lower than Excelsior's tax liability as an LLP, it is possible
that Excelsior should be formed as a GP. How would the same Excelsior
have properly been formed pre tax-modernization? Since there was no
cost-in terms of tax liability-from taking advantage of the LLP liability
shield, Excelsior should have been formed as an LLP.
24 See Ky. REV. STAT. ANN. § 141.010(24) (West 2005) (as amended by H.B. 272 § 3, 2005
Gen. Assem., Reg. Sess. (Ky. 2005)) (including within the definition of "corporation" a foreign
limited liability partnership as defined in § 362.155(7)). A foreign limited liability company
as defined in § 275.015(6), and a foreign limited partnership, as defined in § 362.401(4), are
similarly reached by tax modernization. See supra note 17.
25 Consider a partnership such as Excelsior that owns properties in several states. Does
the cost of an LLP election in any state justify the additional costs in Kentucky?
z6 See, e.g., Stanley L. Blend & Barbara S. deMarigny, Lone Star State Tax Problem: Five
Star Federal Tax Creativity, 4 Bus. ENTITIES 22 (May/June 2002) (describing how, over twenty-
seven months, more than i,6oo corporations or LLCs in Texas converted to the partnership
form in response to the classification by Texas of LLCs as corporations).
[Vol. 94
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So assume that Excelsior was properly formed as an LLP in 1999. Tax
modernization is retroactive.27 Excelsior should now be a GP--or at the
very least, the analysis needs to be done to make sure that Excelsior should
not be changed from an LLP into a GP. s What obligation does a lawyer
have to go back and revisit past transactions to see if a change in the law
requires new attention to the file?
We acknowledge there to be a dearth of reported decisions on choice-
of-entity malpractice.29 There are a variety of explanations. First, the level
of competence expected in the area may be so low that lawsuits generally
are not viable. Second, prior to the rise of the LLC and LLP, the available
options were, generally speaking, the simplified menu of the corporation
(taxed as either a C corp. or an S corp.), the limited partnership, and the
general partnership. 30 Each had clear and unambiguous distinctions as to
organizational structure and tax consequences so choices were more clear
cut and less subject to post hoc review and criticism. Third, major develop-
ments in recent years, including the abandonment of the Kintner classifica-
tion regulations,3' the adoption of "Check-the-Box,"3 and the expanded
availability of the S corporation, 33 have liberalized the availability of pass-
through taxation treatment.
27 See Ky. REV. STAT. ANN. § 141.040(5) (West 2005) (created by H.B. 272 § 7, 2oo5 Gen.
Assem., Reg. Sess. (Ky. 2005)) ("For taxable years beginning on or after January 1, 2005, cor-
porations subject to the tax....").
28 An existing LLP election may be allowed to expire or may be withdrawn. See Ky.
REV. STAT. ANN. §§ 362.555(4), (5). In that instance the partnership continues, just without
the partial limited liability afforded by section 362.220(2). In this respect, it is always helpful
to remember the oft-repeated wisdom of Dean Donald Weidner, the reporter for RUPA, that
LLPs and GPs are not two different entity forms; rather the LLP is simply a subtype of the
GP. See ROBERT W. HILLMAN, ALLAN W. VESTAL & DONALD J WEIDNER, TIE REVISED UNIFORM
PARTNERSHIP ACT 363 (2004). See also REVISED UNIF. P'SHIP ACT § 20I(b) (1997); Rutledge &
Booth, supra note 6, at 97 ("The limited liability partnership ('LLP') is in all respects a general
partnership, save for a revision in the rule of joint and several liability of all partners for the
debts and obligations of the LLP.").
29 For example, the authors have searched in vain for a case discussing the liability of
an attorney or accountant who purportedly organized an S corporation with an impermissible
shareholder, resulting in a C corporation and perhaps vastly different tax consequences to the
shareholders. For a review of malpractice claims against tax attorneys and accountants see
Jacob L. Todres, Malpractice andthe Tax Practitioners: An Analysis of the Areas in Which Malpractice
Occurs, 48 EMORY L.J. 547 (1999).
30 Obviously, here we are discussing "run of the mill" businesses and therefore exclude
more "exotic" structures such as the business trust and special tax classifications such as the
REIT, REMIC, RIC, FSC, DISC, and FASIT
31 See generally Rutledge and Booth, supra note 6, at 54-85.
32 Treas. Reg. § 301.7701-3 (1997).
33 For example, originally an S corporation was limited to ten shareholders (former
I.R.C. § 1371(a)(i) (1958)), a threshold increased to fifteen with conditions in 1976 and fifteen
generally in 1978. In 1981 the limit was raised to twenty-five, and in 1982 to thirty-five. In
1996 that limit was increased to seventy-five. In 2004 the limit was raised to one hundred
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Another issue is that proving "malpractice" in choice of entity will typi-
cally involve challenging the sufficiency of the organizational documents.
Deals of any sophistication turn not on the entity itself but rather on the
documents that effectuate the agreement of the owners. Challenges to
these documents are essentially never seen, perhaps in part because so-
phisticated parties employ their personal counsel to represent their per-
sonal interests in the deal. But that does not mean that such suits cannot be
brought, and counsel to Excelsior is going to have a hard time explaining
why she did not discuss with Excelsior's partners why they should abandon
their LLP status.
V. THE SECOND ORDER ANALYSIS: OF COURSE,
NOTHING Is THAT SIMPLE-EXCEPT WHEN IT IS
By now, those tax attorneys who have followed the occasionally somewhat
unobvious provisions of the tax modernization act as to LLPs will be grum-
bling that it is not quite as simple as we have laid out in Part 2. And they are
right. Because of the provisions which give partners a nonrefundable credit
at the individual level for income taxes paid at the entity-level, it can be
the case that the partners, on an individual basis, are nearly unaffected by
the choice between an entity-taxed LLP and a non-entity-taxed GP, But
such near equipoise is not a/ways the case. That means that the analysis is
still required and the malpractice trap remains.
Defining a domestic or foreign LLP as a corporation subjects the LLP
to income tax liability at rates ranging from four to seven percent. 34 Also
applicable is an alternative minimum tax (AMT) system, with the AMT
and the method of counting the number of shareholders was radically liberalized. See I.R.C.
§ 1361(b)(i)(A) (as amended by the Small Business Job Protection Act of 1996, Pub. L. No.
104-88, § 301, 1 IO Stat. 1755 (1996) and by the American Jobs Creation Act of 2004, Pub. L.
No. Io8-357, § 232, 118 Stat. 418 (2005)); I.R.C. § 1361(c) (as amended by the American
Jobs Creation Act, Pub. L. No. IO8-357, § 231, 118 Stat. 1418 (2004)). The Small Business Job
Protection Act also provided for the Electing Small Business Trust and charitable organiza-
tions as permissible shareholders of an S corporation. See I.R.C. § 1361(c)(2)(A)(v) (added by
§ 1302(a)); I.R.C. § 1361(b)(i)(B) (added by § 1316(a)).
34 Ky. REV. STAT. ANN. § 141.040(5) (West 2005) (created by H.B. 272 § 7, 2005 Gen.
Assem., Reg. Assem. (Ky. 2005)) sets the tax rates applicable to corporate taxable net income
for taxable years beginning on or after January 1, 2005 as follows:
INCOME LEVEL PREVIOUS RATE 2005-2006 2007+
$ 0.00 TO 25,000.00 4.00% 4.00 4.00
25,000.01 TO 50,000.00 5.00 4.00 4.00
50,000.01 TO 100,000.00 6.00 5.00 5.00
100,000.01 TO 250,000.00 7.00 7.00 6.00
MORE THAN 250,000.00 8.25 7.00 6.00
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calculated in one of two ways.35 The entity's tax liability will be equal to the
largest of the three numbers.
36
35 Kentucky's tax modernization, in addition to expanding the reach of the "corporate"
income tax, radically alters its manner of calculation by adopting an AMT (referred to as the
"alternative minimum calculation") providing that for taxable years beginning on or after
January 1, 2005, corporations must pay the greater of the corporate income tax or the AMT. See
Ky. REV. STAT. ANN. § 141.040(5). The AMT is calculated in two manners:
AMTI: AMT1 is equal to the lesser of a gross receipts or a gross profit
tax calculated as follows:
Gross receipts tax: $0.095 per $100 of "gross receipts" (defined
at Ky. REV. STAT. ANN. § 141.040(5)(b)(1) (created by H.B. 272,
§ 7)).
Gross profits tax: $0.75 per $100 of "Kentucky gross profits"
(defined at Ky. REV. STAT. ANN. § 141.010(27) (created by H.B.
272, § 3)).
AMT2: $175.00 (equivalent to $184,211.00 in gross receipts under
the AMT1 gross receipts tax and $23,333.00 in gross profits
under the AMT1 gross profits tax).
See Ky. REV. STAT. ANN. § 141.040(6).
Although not an issue for LLPs (or LLCs), the pre-tax-modernization corporate "license
tax," was imposed at a rate of $2.1o for every $i,ooo of capital employed in the state. See Ky.
REV. STAT. ANN. §§ 136.070, 136.071 (prior to H.B. 272, 2005 Gen.Assem., Reg. Sess. (Ky. 2005)).
The tax was beset by issues including the proper manner of its application to foreign corpora-
tions and its negative impact upon economic development. See Ill. Tool Works v. Ky. Revenue
Cabinet, No. oo-CI-oo623 (Franklin Cir. Ct., Ky. 2003). See, e.g., Robert Schoenberger, Tax
Plan s Economic Effect Debated; Fletcher Cites Better Climate for Business; Doubts Raised, COURIER-
JOURNAL (Louisville), Feb. 22, 2004, at iE ("[Tihe license tax discourages businesses from
building bigger facilities in Kentucky because that means putting more capital in a state where
it is taxed."). The license tax was not applicable to LLPs or any other business structure that
was not incorporated. See Shanks v. Ky. Ind. Oil Co., 8 S.W.2d 383, 384 (Ky. 1928). Under tax
modernization, the license tax is repealed for tax periods ending on or after December 31,
2005. See H.B. 272 § 1, 2oo5 Gen. Assem., Reg. Sess. (Ky. zoo5)
36 Other states imposing an entity-level tax on business structures that, for federal tax
purposes, are pass-through entities include: Alabama (net worth based "business privilege"
tax imposed on LLCs; ALA. CODE § 40-14A-22(a) (1975)); California (entity-level franchise
tax; CAL. REV. & TAX. CODE. §8 17941, 17942 (West 2004)); Illinois 0.5% personal property
replacement tax based on net income; 35 ILL. COMp. STAT. ANN. §8 5/205(b), 5/201(d) (West
2005)); Michigan (Michigan Single Business Tax; Mich. Dept. of Treasury Revenue Admin.
Bulletin 1999-9, available at http://www.michigan.gov/documents/rab99-9_09o73-7.pdf);
New Hampshire (LLCs doing business in the state are subject to a 5% tax on dividends
and interest, an 8.5% business profits tax, and the 0.75% business enterprise tax; N.H. REV.
STAT. ANN. §8 77:1, 77-A:2, 77-E:2 (2005)); New Jersey (partnerships obligated to pay 6.37%
of New Jersey net income allocated to nonresident, noncorporate partners and 9.05% for all
nonresident corporate partners; N.J. STAT. ANN. § 54:ioA-15. I (West 2002)); Ohio (8.5% en-
tity-level tax imposed except where all owners give written consent to state tax jurisdiction;
OHIo REV. CODE ANN. §8 5733.06, 5733.40, 5733.41 (West 1997); Pennsylvania (LLCs except
certain professional LLCs subject to 0.699% capital stock and franchise taxes; 15 PA. CONS.
STAT. § 8925 (1995)); Tennessee (excise tax of 6.5% of net earnings and franchise tax of $0.25
per $soo of net worth applied to LLCs, LLPs and LPs; TENN. CODE ANN. §§ 67-4-2007, 67-
4-2105(a), 67-4-2106(a)) (West 2005); Texas (LLCs, but not LPs, LLPs, or LLLPs, taxed as
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Now the partners of the LLP will be entitled to take a "nonrefund-
able credit" equal, in the aggregate, to the corporate income tax paid that
exceeds the AMT2 of $175 paid by each entity.37 Therefore, the LLP's
partners are always in at least a tax-due position (net loss) of $175, in the
aggregate, and true equipoise is not attainable. This $175 extraction may
be characterized as the "rent" for the benefits of limited liability, and is as-
sessed even if the LLP has no operations or income.
In addition to the issue of the taxation of a single LLP (or other entity
previously taxed as a partnership), there are important issues in the taxa-
tion of multiple entities with a common owner. For example, assume that
Amy has no 2005 income other than the following allocations from the fol-
lowing LLPs:
LLP1
LLP2
LLP3
LLP4
LLP5
LLP6
NET INCOME
$100,000
(75,000)
(65,000)
25,000
78,000
(63,000)
$0
On a net basis, Amy has no taxable income and, prior to tax modernization,
would have no Kentucky income tax liability. But tax modernization does
not operate on a net basis. Rather, the tax is applied entity-by-entity.
$100,000
(75,000)
(65,000)
25,000
78,000
(63,000)
6% CORPORATE
TAx LIABILITY
6,000
0
0
1,500
4,680
0
12,180
AMT2
LIABILITY
0
175
175
0
0
175
525
$ 12,705
though they are corporations; TEx. TAx CODE ANN. § 17 1.001 (Vernon 2005)); and Washington
(all entities subject to business & occupations tax; WASH. REV. CODE §§ 25.05.500 to 25.05.570,
25.15.005-25-15.902 (2005)). See generally Ely Overview, supra note 7, at Exhibits B, C.
37 Ky. REV. STAT. ANN. § 141.020(3) (West 2005).
LLP1
LLP2
LLP3
LLP4
LLP5
LLP6
TOTAL TAX
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Thanks to tax modernization, Amy's tax liability has gone from $o.oo to
$12,705.00.38 Obviously Amy is not happy.39 And obviously her counsel has
some in-depth analysis to undertake to see whether or not her unhappiness
can be eliminated, reduced, or at a minimum explained.
Further potential exists for a failure of equipoise at the individual part-
ner level, again making the analysis required and-you have to love the
way this works-introducing yet another (and far more complicated) trap
for the attorneys who form the entity and, perhaps, for the attorney who
represents the entity post formation. Consider the GP/LLP decision from
the standpoint of two partners with different individual tax situations.
Able and Baker are the partners in Excelsior. Excelsior is the only part-
nership with which Able is involved. Excelsior will pay corporate taxes of
$250,000 in 2005, and Able and Baker will each have a credit of half of
this amount less half of $175 on their personal tax returns. 40 But Baker is
involved in a number of partnerships with Kentucky activities, some of
which are profitable in any one year and some of which are not. Further-
more, Baker lives in a state other than Kentucky, and it is not clear that his
home state will afford him a credit on his state income tax filing for the
entity-level taxes paid by Excelsior.4' So while the application of the corpo-
rate income taxes to Excelsior may be nearly transparent to Able, it is not,
or at least may not be, to Baker. Able is liability phobic, and for that reason
Excelsior is organized in Delaware, a full-shield jurisdiction.42 Counselor,
how do you recommend dealing with this problem?
VI. COUNSEL'S OBLIGATION TO ADVISE CURRENT AND PRIOR CLIENTS
OF THE IMPACT OF TAX MODERNIZATION
This brings us to our central question: does the attorney who represented
Able and Baker in the formation of Excelsior have an obligation to revisit
the structure with them and analyze their situation under tax moderniza-
tion?43 This question will in part turn on whether the representation ter-
38 This example assumes the AMT2 liability is less than either of the AMTi calcula-
tions; at $185,ooo in gross receipts AMTi exceeds AMTz liability.
39 We may assume that Amy feels like Arthur Godfrey, who observed, "I'm proud to be
paying taxes in the United States. The only thing is-I could be just as proud for half the
money." Quotable Online, http://wwwquotableonline.com/ArthurGodfrey.html (last visited
Oct. 18, 2005).
40 See Ky. REV. STAT. ANN. § 141.040(6) (West 2005) (created by H.B. 272 § 7, 2005 Gen.
Assem., Reg. Sess. (Ky. 2005)).
41 See Ky. REV. STAT. ANN. § 141.040(9) (West 2005) (created by H.B. 272 § 7, 2oo5 Gen.
Assem., Reg. Sess. (Ky. 2005)).
42 See supra note 2 1.
43 It is worth noting that presumably Able and Baker consulted an attorney, that she
represented one or both of them in the organization of Excelsior, and that upon its formation
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minated at some point in the distant past, if the representation was recent
and never formally closed, or if it is rather ongoing. If the representation of
the partnership is ongoing, counsel would be hard pressed to argue that she
is not under an obligation to keep abreast of changes in law affecting her
client, and one of those changes is certainly tax modernization. 44 But what
about representation completed some time in the past?45 This somewhat
begs the question of whether the representation was truly closed. Was the
relationship initiated with an engagement letter that defined its scope?46
Was there a letter advising the client of the completion of the engagement
and of the return of all client property?47 Do the partners still think of the
attorney as the lawyer for the partnership? Whether the attorney-client re-
lationship, and with it a cessation of some, but not all, of the attorney's
obligations to the client, has been terminated is a question of fact,48 and
"the mere completion of a particular matter may not terminate the rela-
tionship, particularly if the client does not understand that the matter is
concluded." 49 Keeping in mind that the advice to qualify Excelsior as an
LLP was proper counsel at the time rendered, we are here concerned with
her attorney-client responsibilities shifted to Excelsior. See, e.g., Manion v. Nagin, No. 00-238
ADM/RLE, 2004 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 1776 (D. Minn. Feb. 5, 2004), aff'd, 394 E3d 1o62 (8th Cir.
2005). But see Pucci v. Santi, 711 E Supp. 9 16, 927 n.4 (N.D. 11. 1989) (stating that an attorney
for a partnership also represents each general partner); Schwartz v. Broadcast Music, Inc., 16
ER.D. 31, 32 (S.D.N.Y. 1954) (stating that each member of unincorporated association is a
client of the association's attorney); NEW YORK CITY BAR Ass'N COMM. ON PROF'L AND JUDICIAL
ETHICS, FORMAL OPINION 1986-2 (1986).
44 One of us had the experience of lecturing in a state that had just adopted RUPA.
While addressing the just-passed effective date of the new law, a participant leapt to his feet
and ran from the room. Later, it was learned that only that morning he had closed a deal and
issued his opinion based on the old (and now repealed) partnership act.
45 See Robert R. Keatinge & David C. Little, The Former and Quiescent Client, 33 COLO.
LAW. 79, 79 (Aug. 2004) ("If the relationship continues, even though the matter has been con-
cluded, the attorney will still have duties, which may include the duty to monitor changes in
the law as they affect the transactions in which the attorney has been involved.").
46 See generally t GARY A. MUNNEKE & ANTHONY E. DAVIS, THE ESSENTIAL FORMBOOK-
COMPREHENSIVE MANAGEMENT TOOLS FOR LAWYERS ch. 3 (2000); Anthony E. Davis, The
Importance of Engagement Letters, 231 N.Y.L.J. 3 (May 2, 2005).
47 See RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF THE LAW GOVERNING LAWYERS § 33 (2004) (discussing a
lawyer's duties when representation terminates); see also 2oos ALAS Loss Prevention Manual
§ 7.5.
48 See Lovell v. Winchester, 941 S.W.zd 466,468 (Ky. 1997) ("Courts have found that the
[attorney-client] relationship is created as a result of the client's reasonable belief or expecta-
tion that the lawyer is undertaking the representation."); seealso In re Bordelon, 894 So. 2d 315,
322 (La. zoo5) ("[Ilt is true as a general principle that the existence of an attorney/client rela-
tionship 'turns largely on the client's subjective belief that it exists...."') (quoting Louisiana
State Bar Ass'n v. Bosworth, 481 So. 2d 567,571 (La. 1986)); Lawrence Say. Bank v. Levenson,
797 N.E.2d 485,492 (Mass. App. Ct. 2003) (indicating that "[tihe existence of an attorney-cli-
ent relationship is a question to be resolved by the trier of fact....").
49 Keatinge & Little, supra note 45, at 80.
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a lawyer's obligation to go back to someone she perceives to be a former
client and advise them anew.
While there is little law on a lawyer's continuing obligations to a former
client, the decision rendered in Hargett v. Hollandso is instructive. Therein
the question was raised as to an attorney's obligation "to fulfill a continu-
ing duty to prepare a will properly reflecting the testator's testamentary
intent."' Beneficiaries of the will had brought an action against decedent's
attorney asserting counsel, sua sponte, should have seen to the updating of
the instrument.5 This assertion was rejected.5 3
Absent allegations of an ongoing attorney-client relationship between testa-
tor and defendant with regard to the will from which such a continuing duty
might arise, or allegations of facts from which such a relationship may be in-
ferred, the allegations which are contained in the complaint are insufficient
to place any continuing duty on defendant to review or correct the prepared
will, or to draft another will.
... An attorney who is employed to draft a will and supervise its execution
and who has no further contractual relationship with the testator with regard to the
will has no continuing duty to the testator regarding the will after the will
has been executed.5
The Restatement (Third) of the Law Governing Lawyers, at Section 33,
comment h, provides in part:
A lawyer has no general continuing obligation to pass on to a former client
information relating to the former representation. The lawyer might, how-
ever, have such an obligation if the lawyer continues to represent the client
in other matters or under any continuing relationship. Whether such an ob-
ligation exists regarding particular information depends on such factors as
the client's reasonable expectations; the scope, magnitude, and duration of
the client/lawyer relationship; the evident significance of the information to
the client; the burden on the lawyer making disclosure; and the likelihood
that the client will receive the information from another source. 55
Especially telling with respect to this aspect of the restatement is the
reporter's note on comment h, which provides in part: "No authority on
point has been found on post-representation duties to inform a present
50 Hargett v. Holland, 447 S.E.2d 784 (N.C. 1994).
51 Id. at 788.
52 Id. at 787.
53 Id. at 789.
54 Id. at 788 (emphasis added).
55 RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF THE LAW GOVERNING LAWYERS § 33 cmt. h (2000).
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client about material developments relating to a formerly completed and
different matter. The rule stated is believed to follow from the fiduciary
duties inherent in the ongoing client-lawyer relationship."56
Given the above, perhaps counsel can avoid any exposure if she does
not advise the partnership she organized as an LLP years ago, that has
not had contact with her for several years, and for which she knows that
new counsel, experienced in partnership law, both organizational and tax, is
serving as attorney.5 7 But the absence of exposure is not assured. And it will
not be frequent that prior counsel will be in such an optimum position.
More frequently, the engagement will never have been properly closed.
In the meantime, the firm may have mailed the partnership holiday cards
or firm newsletters/marketing materials, 8 and there may indeed be a basis
for the partners to reasonably believe that she was at least "a," if not "the,"
lawyer for the partnership. Especially disturbing would be if the attorney
off-handedly said "I'll let you know if anything changes." She may not
recall making the statement, but Able and/or Baker will remember it, and
it alone may have raised her standard of care sufficiently to make her re-
sponsible for not advising the partners of the implications of tax modern-
ization.59 Conversely, if the attorney was prescient enough to tell Able and
56 Id.; see also 2005 ALAS Loss Prevention Manual § IVC. § 4-7:
Because a significant passage of time often occurs between creation
of an estate plan and the client's death, changes can occur in the law or
facts relevant to the estate plan after the client's will has been executed.
The question presented is whether the lawyer has a legal or ethical duty
to seek out and advise the client, at least where the changes clearly re-
quire the client to reconsider the plan and the lawyer has no reason to
believe that the client understands the significance of the changes.
Firms may sometimes be willing to assume such an obligation
where, for example, the client is a regular client of the firm and is con-
sulted regularly. In most cases, on the other hand, an open-ended obliga-
tion to advise a one-time client about the implications of all changes in
the client's circumstances, or even all changes in the law, could create
substantial potential malpractice exposure.
57 See, e.g., Maddox v. Burlingame, 517 N.W.2d 816, 818 (Mich. Ct.App. 1994) ("Retention
of an alternative attorney effectively terminates the attorney-client relationship between the
[attorney] and the client.").
58 Consider in this context the possible distinctions between "To Friends of this Firm"
and "To Clients of This Firm." See, e.g., Shearing v. Allergan, Inc., No. CV-5 -9 3 -866 DWH
(LRL), 1994 U.S. Dist. LEXIS z168o, at *2 n.i (D. Nev. Apr. 4, 1994) (finding an ongoing re-
lationship based on a quote from the firm to the "former" client: "We... value our relationship
with you and look forward to responding to your legal needs for many years to come."); SWS
Fin. Fund v. Salomon Bros. Inc., 790 E Supp 1392, 1396 (N.D. I11. 1992) (finding an ongoing
relationship based on a firm letter stating, "I appreciate the opportunity to provide legal ser-
vices to you, as do others within our firm.... Please do not hesitate to contact me if you have
any questions regarding the enclosed.").
59 See, e.g., Lama Holding Co. v. Shearman & Sterling, 758 E Supp. 159, 161 (S.D.N.Y.
199i ) (indicating that "[iun attorney-client agreements there may be liability 'when there is
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Baker that "[t]here have been press reports that the governor's office might
change the tax treatment of these new structures; check back with me from
time to time and we can redo the analysis," then it will be difficult to argue
that she has not met her standard of care.'
Another question is whether the attorney wants to forego the positive
prospect of reinitiating a relationship and the opportunity to provide coun-
sel (and collect a well earned fee)? But that is a different issue.
VII. CONCLUSION
One of us thinks that the tax-modernization treatment of LLPs is actually
theoretically correct; that the availability of limited liability should be tied
to entity-level taxation. 61 Of course, even he would not have supported it
as a stand-alone measure, one state essentially alone. And he would have
favored it as part of a clearly articulated sweeping overhaul of business
entity regulation which would have included the elimination of LLCs and
Subchapter S corporations.
The other one of us has some significant doubts about the substan-
tive merits of the 2005 tax modernization treatment of LLPs and other
traditionally pass-through structures in light of the burdens imposed on
small and medium-sized businesses in increased compliance costs61 and
a promise to perform and no subsequent performance, or when the attorney has explicitly
undertaken to discharge a specific task and then failed to do so."').
60 See Harrison v. Guenther, Guenther & Gillane, 98-979 (La. App. 5 Cir. 1/26/99), 726
So. 2d 508, 511.
6I See J. William Callison, Federalism, Regulatory Competition, and the Limited Liability
Movement: The Coyote Howled and the Herd Stampeded, 26 J. CoRP. L. 951 (zooi); Allan W. Vestal,
"Real Partnerships" and Real Problems: Conforming Business Entity Law to Fiscal Realities and
Popular Conceptions, 28 DEL. J. CORP. L. 877 (2003); AMER CAN LAW INSTITUTE, FEDERAL INCOME
TAx PROJECT-TAxATION OF PRIVATE BUSINESS ENTERPRISES 54 (George K. Yin & David J.
Shakow, reporters)(1999); ADMIN. OF GOVERNOR PAUL E. PATTON, SECURING KENTUCKY'S
FUTURE (2003) (on file with the Kentucky Law Journal):
The Business License Tax could be viewed as the price a business pays
to receive the protection granted by government. A business owner could
get this kind of protection from an insurance company. They would pay
for the protection. Limited liability has a value to a business owner. The
government that grants that value should receive some of it.
6z As observed by one accounting firm, "Kentucky will now be viewed by out-of-state
businesses as having a state filing requirement for flow-through entities that is the most com-
plicated of any state in the Union." New Kentucky Tax Law, FIN. NEWS & VIEWS (Strothman &
Co., Louisville, Ky.), Mar. 22, 2005. Another accounting firm observed "Effective for fiscal
years beginning on or after January I, 2005, Kentucky's corporate tax base has been expanded
to include all entities that have the legal benefit of limited liability, which makes this state's
laws very different from the federal law and the law in most other states." Summary of Major
Provisions of Tax Modernization (Chilton & Medley PLC, Louisville, Ky.), Mar. 28, 2005 (on file
with the Kentucky Law Journal).
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absolute increases in tax liability,63 questions the rent extraction inherent
in linking entity-level taxation to limited liability,64 is rather fond of LLCs
and would not want to see them eliminated, and believes that a fairly sub-
stantial clean-up of the tax modernization provisions generally is going to
be required before we are finished. 65
But whether you think the tax-modernization treatment of LLPs is a
good thing or a bad thing, it is clear that it raises some disturbing poten-
tial malpractice concerns for Kentucky practitioners. And it is further clear
that these concerns are compounded by the retroactive application of the
tax modernization provisions. That these malpractice concerns are raised
by tax modernization is particularly troubling because of the nature of the
provisions that give rise to the malpractice liability. The decision to form
an LLP and not a GP was virtually automatic under the now-abandoned
tax treatment of LLPs. To make that decision, which the prior regime in ef-
fect said was not worthy of critical thought, the basis for a retroactive claim
seems fundamentally unfair and ill advised.
The bigger problem is the dilemma now faced by the business commu-
nity, which rushed to adopt the LLP and LLC forms. In a very short period
of time, we have created two new forms of business entities and labeled
them as "good for business." 66 Only a few years later, what was heralded as
a business boosting, revenue-neutral innovation was recharacterized as a
"tax loophole. ' 67 We proceed to reverse the most basic rules of taxation and
liability for these new entities, and then make those reversals retroactive.
Again, the result is heralded as being "good for business." We have sent
Kentucky's business community remarkably incompatible signals.
Perhaps the worst feature of all is that these fundamental changes-
both the creation of the business forms and the change in their tax status
-have been accomplished with essentially no public debate or thoughtful
63 As characterized by Chilton & Medley PLC:
Individual partners, members, or shareholders of pass-through entities
will continue to include in their income their distributive share of flow-
through income. They will also receive a Kentucky tax credit for their
share of the tax paid on net income at the entity-level. Unfortunately,
excess credits are neither refundable nor can they be used to reduce
tax on other income. Thus, since in many situations the entity-level
tax will exceed individual taxes, this provision results in an increase in
Kentucky income tax on many business activities.
Summary of Major Provisions of Tax Modernization (Chilton & Medley PLC, Louisville, Ky.),
Mar. z8, 2005 (on file with the Kentucky Law Journal).
64 See ADMIN. OF GOVERNOR PAUL E. PA'rroN, supra note 61.
65 For example, the definition of "bulk delivery costs," Ky. REV. STAT. ANN. § 141.010(29)
(West 2005) (created by H.B. 272 § 3, 2005 Gen. Assem., Reg. Sess. (Ky. zoo5)), bears little
resemblance to a statement originally crafted in the English language.
66 See, e.g., Jordan, supra note 5.
67 See ADMIN. OF GOVERNOR PAUL E. PATTON, supra note 5.
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consideration of the public policy consequences of the moves. One could
view the lurching path of these developments as being driven entirely
by short-term revenue considerations. In a period of perceived surplus
we were willing to give the business community a huge, if publicly unac-
knowledged, windfall through the creation of LLPs and LLCs, enabling
limited liability and flow-through taxation in a manner previously unseen.
With the economy softened, we recoup the "lost" revenue by changing the
tax treatment of the new forms.
Willie Sutton would be proud,'8 but it is hardly the stuff of which good
public policy is made. To be truly "good for business," Kentucky needs,
first, to base tax policy on good basic public policy analysis and realistic
long-term revenue projections. Second, we need not change tax policy
without a good justification, looking further than a short-term revenue
shortfall. Third, we need to recognize the value of uniformity with other
states and deviate from business-center states only when there is a compel-
ling justification to do so.69
Regardless of whether one agrees with the outcome or not, tax modern-
ization's treatment of LLPs is not a step to be celebrated. It raises a variety
of malpractice concerns for Kentucky's attorneys. It ought to raise serious
concerns of process and outcome for Kentucky's business community. Nei-
ther is a desired result.
68 Steve Cocheo, The Bank Robber, the Quote, and the Final Irony, 89 A.B.A. BANKING J. 7!
(March 1997) (presenting evidence that Sutton did not make the comment attributed to him,
namely that he robbed banks "because that's where the money is," but subsequently adopted
it as his own).
69 See supra note 62 and accompanying text.
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